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Abstract
Previous studies have demonstrated that refugee presence makes host states more likely to
experience conflicts. Although some refugees migrate with arms, combatants, and ideologies
conducive to conflict, the vast majority almost never engage in violence. Their presence;
however, impacts the economy and alters previously established social contracts, consequently
making local groups more likely to engage in violence. The impact of a refugee population on a
host economy; however, is conditional. While the factors that make refugees an asset in one
country and a burden in another have a significant impact on the spread of conflict, they still
remain undiscovered in the literature. I argue that domestic policies that inhibit refugee economic
integration, through restricting freedom of movement and ability to sustain a livelihood, have a
negative impact on the economy and make a host community more likely to engage in violent
conflicts. To examine the relationship between policies related movement and employment on
conflict spillover, I conduct a large N statistical analysis using data that covers 198 instances
between 2005 and 2009. I find that freedom of movement is a significant factor in the
relationship.
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Chapter One: Introduction
When Hawa, a Syrian refugee living with her two children in Lebanon, went to renew her
residency papers to apply for a job, the local administrator’s son threatened to burn her alive if
she did not have sex with him in exchange for issuing the documents. Hawa did not report him to
the police because, as she put in her words: “I wanted to call the police to protect myself, but
what could I do? I have no residency permit. If I called the police, I could be arrested” (HRW
2016, par 67).
Syrian refugees in Lebanon, like Hawa, have been losing their legal residency status
since members of Jabhat al-Nusra took over Arsal refugee camp near the Syrian borders in 2014
and killed ten Lebanese soldiers (Saad 2014). In response, the Lebanese government banned
refugee-employment for both recognized and illegal refugees (HRW 2016). While the
government claims that the new restrictions aim to decrease security threats, as Hawa’s story
demonstrates, these policies facilitate an environment of arbitrary detention, harassment, and
exploitation. Most important, these policies prevent refugee economic integration and increase
the burden of hosting as refugees continue to depend on humanitarian aid instead of generating
sustainable incomes.
The Arsal attacks demonstrate how refugees mobilize, carry arms, and spread violent
conflicts to host states. However, the vast majority of refugees almost never engage in violence
(Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). They escape their home state at the fear of persecution and seek
safe havens in host countries, where they also become victims of “warrior groups,” local juntas,
and host governments. So, how does the presence of refugees make host states more likely to
experience conflicts?
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Lebanon’s decision to restrict refugee ability to sustain a livelihood and to move legally
have increased security threats in the country. On the one hand, the stifling restriction have
forced 70% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon under the poverty line, making them “prime targets
for Islamist extremist groups who are paying money for service” (HRW 2016a, par 14). On the
other hand, precluding refugee economic rights and inhibiting their economic integration have
negative effects on local populations. Refugees, who cannot sustain an income legally, continue
to depend on humanitarian aid from the host government for prolonged periods of time, which
alters previously established distribution of resources and lowers the cost of fighting for local
groups. These policies have also changed the perception of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, where
they once were treated with sympathy, by the end of 2014, they became scapegoats for already
existing challenges and the victims of deadly revenge attacks (Kullab 2015; HRW 2014). In sum,
“Lebanon’s shortsighted policies are setting the stage for a potentially explosive situation”
(HRW 2016, par 14).
A better understanding of the relationship between refugee presence and spread of
violence can hopefully help explore how host states can mitigate conflict spillovers. After
reviewing the relevant literature on the contagion of conflicts, refugee-related violence, and the
impact of hosting on the local economy, in Chapter Two, I argue that refugee ability to move and
work are crucial factors to understanding how their presence can lead to conflict spillover. I
hypothesize that host countries that restrict these two conditions are more likely to experience
violent conflicts.
Then, in Chapter Three, I describe my methodological approach, a large N statistical
analysis research design. I operationalize the independent variable, refugee presence; the
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conditional variables, freedom of movement and residence, and ability to sustain a livelihood;
and the dependent variable, spread of violence.
In Chapter Four, I generate the dataset. Then, I run the regression models and discuss the
statistical and quantitative operations. Finally, I present the findings, interpret them, and draw
upon cases from the reports that demonstrate the statistical findings of the study.
In Chapter Five, I conclude my Independent Study. I summarize the findings that the
implementation of refugee right to move and reside freely is a significant factor that can mitigate
conflict spillover to host states. I discuss the study’s limitations and implications. Finally, I
discuss possible directions for further research.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
There is a plethora of research on refugees and conflict spillover. Despite this expansive
literature, some serious theoretical gaps exist. In this chapter, I briefly discuss how conflicts
spread, then I discuss the impact of hosting refugees on the local economy and how their
presence may lead to conflicts. Following that, I emphasize the role of host state policies in
mitigating the spread of violence. Finally, I develop the argument that refugee freedom of
movement and residence and their ability to work and participate in the local economy are
critical conditions in this relationship.

Conflict Spillover
The literature does not have a clear-cut explanation for how conflicts spread to
neighboring states (Gleditsch 2007). At the same time, states that share borders with a country
experiencing a civil war are twice as likely to undergo conflicts as well (Gleditsch and Buhaug
2008). In the literature, there are four main theoretical frameworks that explain the contagion of
conflicts.
In 1998, Kuran argued that there is a “demonstration effect” by which the presence of an
ethnic conflict in country A makes the citizens of country B more aware of their grievances,
which raises expectations of ethnic conflicts, and generates global public sympathy toward their
political aspirations. Similarly, transnational ethnic ties affect the spread of conflicts;
mobilization by a group in country A will change prospects for mobilization by the same group
in country B (Halperin 1998; Forsberg 2008).
The presence of civil wars also exerts negative impact on the economic growth of the
entire region, especially neighboring countries (Murdoch and Sandler 2002). Conflict in country
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A may affect the flow of goods and trade in neighboring country B. Taking longer routes, if
possible, to transfer goods imposes higher costs for country B. The war in Mozambique, for
example, doubled Malawi’s international transport and import costs (Sesay 2004). The economic
impact of conflicts also repels investors not only away from the country experiencing violence,
but also from the region (Sesay 2004). In fact, Murdoch and Sandler (2002) found that the
presence of conflict in country A decreases B’s annual growth rate by 0.5 percentage points.
Slow economic growth and high poverty are the main determinants of insurgency (Collier and
Hoeffler 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2001).
Finally, recent studies have shown that there is a relationship between refugee presence
and spillover of conflicts. While refugee migration is widely discussed in the literature, scholars
tend to treat population movement as a consequence of conflict rather than a possible cause. The
presence of refugees increases the risk of subsequent conflicts in host and origin states. However,
the vast majority of refugees never directly engage in violence. Hence, the mechanism by which
refugees affect the spread of violent conflicts is complex and obscure (Salehyan and Gleditsch
2006; Gleditsch and Buhaug 2008).
Untangling this relationship is more important than it has ever been. The wave of
refugees from Syria alone is the largest refugee crisis since World War II (European Commission
2015). Refugees are not only the most immediate impact of conflicts on neighboring countries
(Sesay 2004), but they also tend to stay in their countries of asylum long after the conflict is over
(World Bank 2003). On average, refugees tend to stay in host countries for 17 years (Loescher
and Milner 2005). Therefore, they have significant long-term economic, social, political, and
environmental effects on host states (Gomez 2010). While the vast majority of studies treat
refugee presence as a burden, refugees have the potential to induce economic growth and
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increase the global political leverage of the host (Jacobsen 2002). Refugee subsequent economic
impact depends on the prevailing economic circumstance of the host country (Sesay 2004).
Hence, changing the economic environment changes refugee impact on the economy from a
burden to an asset, which may prevent the spillover of violent conflicts.
Countries that share borders with neighbors experiencing war are more prone to undergo
conflict through the demonstration effect, transnational ethnic ties, and economic shocks.
Neighboring states have few tools to alleviate the intensity of these three factors. However, host
states may mitigate refugee-related violence through economic policies since the impact of
refugees on host state economic wellbeing depends on the host’s economic conditions. In other
words, refugee-related policies may change the impact of refugees on the local economy and
decrease the probability of conflict spillover. To understand how refugee presence affects the
spread of conflicts, the following section lays out the prominent relevant arguments in the
literature.

Refugees and Conflict Spillover
Before delving into this section, it is important to note that the presence of refugees does
not always have a significant impact on host states. For example, Albanian Kosovar refugees
stayed in Macedonia and Albania for six weeks before they returned to Kosovo in 1999 and had
little subsequent impact on their host countries (Jacobsen 2001). However, under certain
conditions, the presence of refugees impacts host states and leads to violent conflicts. This
section aims to explore the political economy factors that explain the relationship between
refugees and the spread of violence.
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Political violence and oppressive governments cause the vast majority of refugee
displacement from their home countries (Salehyan 2007). Violence and conflicts; therefore, are
not limited to the sending government, but may continue and spread to host states as some
refugees are combatants who escape with arms and ideologies conducive to violence (Salehyan
and Gleditsch 2006). These factors, coupled with the harsh violent conditions they experienced
in their home state, motivate refugees to oppose their sending government, or the group that
caused their displacement, and rally against them from host countries (Salehyan 2007).
Furthermore, harsh economic conditions and the struggle to make a dignified living lower their
cost of fighting and joining rebel groups (Salehyan 2007). The expansion of refugee social
networks into host communities facilitates the emergence of refugee political structures and
“refugee warrior” groups, who challenge the host state to sustain sustain rebel networks and
militant activities across-borders (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). When these groups emerge,
they turn camps into rebel sanctuaries, and a base of operations and recruitment (Zolberg,
Suhrke, and Aguayo 1992; Salehyan 2005). These groups not only attract refugees because of
their opposition to the sending government, but they may also provide them with better standards
of living and a “sense of purpose” (Salehyan 2007, 225). To recruit combatants, win local
support, and gain legitimacy, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), for example, spent
significant sums on refugees and invested in the provision of social services in Lebanon (Gerdes
2006).
In response to these challenges, host and sending governments reallocate resources to
tackle rebel groups, expanding the geographic boundaries of violence. These attacks can ravage
the host population and make them more hostile toward refugees. Furthermore, the inability of
the UNHCR and host governments to separate civilian refugees from combatants feeds into the
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perception that all refugees are associated with violence, making violence more likely to spread.
Hence, the presence of armed activities in camps and around the host country creates security
risks and leads to the spread of conflict (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006).
In Lebanon, the PLO attacked Israeli bases from refugee camps. In return, Israel
continuously bombed the bordering areas, which displaced the Shi’a population and forced them
to move to Beirut. The presence of the PLO also aggravated the Lebanese Christian Maronite
leaders in Beirut and accused the Lebanese government of encouraging attacks against Israel.
Therefore, the Maronite leadership formed independent militias to fight the PLO in southern
Lebanon. In April 1975, Maronite militias killed 27 Palestinian refugees, marking the beginning
of the Lebanese civil war. As a result, Muslim leaders in the country felt undermined and sought
more political representation by joining the war. Soon thereafter, the Syrian government sent
troops to Lebanon, and in 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon to weaken the PLO (Salehyan and
Gleditsch 2006; Cleveland 2000). The war, which lasted for 15 years, left 150,000 people dead
and displaced a quarter of the population (Los Angeles Times 2008).
As the Lebanese case demonstrates, ethnic and religious polarization impact the spread of
violence to host communities. Refugees, who share ethnic relations with an already existing
opposition group in the host country, are likely to support and provide resources to that group.
As refugees interact with local populations, exchange ideas, and expand already existing social
networks, they become more likely to provide them with inspiration and arms they brought from
their home states, facilitating their mobilization (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). This is
especially successful at spreading violence when local opposition groups lack the means to
challenge the regime. For example, Somali refugees in Ethiopia collaborated with ethnic Somali
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separatists and supported their political aspirations (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Supporting
local opposition groups undermines the host state’s sovereignty, causing serious security threats.
While these examples demonstrate how refugees lead to the spread of violence, in fact,
most refugees almost never engage in violence. Rather, their presence changes the ethnic balance
of the country, igniting discontent among locals toward refugees and the host government
(Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Large refugee influxes can also transform demographic patterns,
threaten social status of local groups, raise nativist sentiments among “sons of the soil” groups groups that draw ancestral heritage to the home region and make up the majority of the
population in that area - and make them more likely to engage in rebellions (Weiner 1978).
Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) found that it is not historical or ethnic animosities that explain the
rise of such conflicts; rather, it is the change in social status and increase in competition among
local populations and refugee groups, especially when the refugee population is ethnically
similar to one of the local groups. Hence, local groups fear an actual, or perceived, change in
their social contracts and share of economic resources. In response to the change in
demographics, host states reallocate their resources to maintain political and economic stability.
The presence of refugees also forces the host state to redirect assets from developmental projects
to combat refugee warriors and provide humanitarian aid (Murdoch and Sandler 2002).
Furthermore, access to aid influences the host population’s attitude toward refugees. If citizens
of the host state perceive access to aid as unfair, then they may respond by boycotting businesses
with refugees and harassing them. Liberian refugees in Ghana, for example, reported that
Ghanaians would stop to buy their products, but once they heard their distinct accents, they
would walk away (Dick 2002).
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Despite the common perception, refugees do not always have a negative impact on host
economies. In some cases, host communities become more hostile toward refugee groups as
local groups and host governments “blamed [refugees] for crime, loose morals, and other
problems in the community” (Jacobsen 2005, 32). In other words, refugees become the scapegoat
for already existing economic and political problems. The Guinean government, for example,
blamed Liberian refugees for the rise in crime rates although the country had already been
experiencing rising poverty after the adoption of structural adjustment programs before Liberians
even sought asylum in Guinea (Jacobsen 2001). Perceiving refugees as the cause of economic
and political challenges generates resentment toward refugee groups and causes clashes
(Jacobsen 2001). In those instances, host states may use security forces to encourage refugee
repatriation, and local groups may join the security apparatus in coercing refugees into leaving.
The Bangladeshi government, for example, repeatedly used its security forces to coerce
repatriation of Burmese refugees (Lischer 2005).
The relationship between refugee presence and violence spillover is inseparable from
precarity and economic hardships. Unemployment, underemployment, the struggle regarding
citizenship, labour rights, social wage, and migration (Neilson and Rossiter 2005; Standing
2011) aggravate refugee grievances and indirectly cause local groups to mobilize. This
relationship is most evident in refugee camps, where “refugees are denied the right to integrate in
the asylum state, yet are unlikely to be restored to meaningful membership in their home
community” (Hathaway and Neve 1997, 131). Warehousing robs refugees of their freedom of
movement and right to work (Chen, 2005). Therefore, camps raise the level of precarity, directly
affecting the decision to participate in homeland activism and mobilization (Banki 2013a). Banki
(2013a) also argues that even if precarity restricts refugees access to political gatekeepers, its
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mere existence encourages other forms of mobilization that are more powerful in nature.
Individual and collective motivations are strongest amongst refugees whose grievances are
deeply rooted in their de-territorialized identities (O’Kane 2007 and Banki 2013a). The strength
of their motivation stems from the absence of a homeland where they can change or escape their
identity as refugees (Banki 2013a). Even when refugees do not employ violence as a tactic to
achieve their political goals, their mobilization threatens the social status of local groups and host
governments, and encourages them to use violence to subdue their mobilization and maintain the
status quo.
The literature on the relationship between refugee presence and spread of violent
conflicts shows that the underlying factors that give rise to violence in host states are tied to
economic demands and grievances. Refugee economic losses, poor standard of living, and high
precarity levels lower their cost to mobilize and fight. Therefore, they become motivated to join
rebel groups who can provide them with income and services. Similarly, their mere presence
threatens pre-existing social contracts between local groups and the host regime, altering the
allocation of resources. As a result, the cost of fighting for local groups decreases as they become
more likely to use violence to restore the previous distribution of resources.
However, the presence of refugees is not always associated with a negative economic
impact. Recent studies have shown that under certain conditions, refugees may have a positive
economic impact on host states (Jacobsen 2002). To understand how refugee presence affects the
host economy, the next section lays out the prominent findings in the relevant literature.
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Refugees and Economies
The presence of refugees, and the subsequent rise in the number of foreign humanitarian
workers, increases the demand for limited resources in host countries, surging the demand and
prices of goods and services. For example, the presence of refugees in western Tanzania,
combined with the drought of 1997, increased the prices of non-aid products such as meat, salt,
and kerosene by 100 to 400 percent (Whitaker 2002; Maystadt and Verwimp 2009). Although
prices are likely to increase, host communities may benefit from the presence of refugees
through humanitarian aid that tends to “find its way into the host community” (Jacobsen 2002,
581). Refugees also bring their assets and productive capacities to the host state (Maystadt and
Verwimp 2009). Hence, they have the financial ability, or at least entrepreneurial spirit, to invest
and create new employment opportunities. Between 2005 and 2006, for example, the Jordanian
Ministry of Industry and Trade recorded 4,616 registered Iraqi enterprises and around $300,000
million in Iraqi investment (Fagen 2009).
Refugee presence; therefore, has an impact on employment and wages. Large refugee
influxes increase labor supply and increase the host’s labor market. Chambers (1986) noted that
refugee workers are more reliable, more adequate, cheaper, ‘fed free,’ and more available when
needed than local workers. As a result, employers find it more profitable to hire refugees, which
may also suppress wages (Maystadt and Verwimp 2009). As farmers in Western Tanzania, for
examples, replaced local workers with refugee farmers, wages decreased by 50 percent in
numerous areas around the country (Whitaker 1999). However, refugee workers and native
workers are not always substitutable (Ottaviano and Peri 2012). Refugees provide cheap labor in
agriculture, construction, housekeeping, and catering; therefore, their presence mainly affects the
wages of non-skilled workers (Maystadt and Verwimp 2014). Hence, most studies have shown
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that refugees have no significant, or at least modest, impact on employment prospects for native
workers (Friedberg and Hunt 1995; Fakih and Ibrahim 2015). In fact, new refugees and
immigrants alike may have a negative impact on other immigrants and not the local labor force
(D’Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri 2010). New influxes of refugees in the UK, for example, had no
impact on the compensations of British workers, but had a negative impact on the wages of
earlier immigrants (Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth 2012).
At the same time, local skilled workers may gain from refugee presence. Waters (1996)
showed that local professionals who worked for humanitarian operations were paid two to three
times more than their colleagues who worked for similar local organizations. In camp regions, 50
percent of health workers and 35 percent of dispensary employees left their government posts to
join relief agencies that paid higher salaries, forcing local employers to increase salaries
(Whitaker 1999). Overall, the impact of refugee presence on employment and wages depends on
government policies toward refugees (Fakih and Ibrahim 2015).
Finally, hosting large groups of refugees impacts access to health and educational
services. In the short run, as the population grows, relief organizations cannot build new
hospitals and schools to amend the shortage in public services. As a result, the access of the
poorest segment of the host community to these facilities decreases (Chambers 1986). On the
other hand, some host communities may be better off and reap the benefits of hosting refugees as
humanitarian organizations open their doors to refugees and locals alike. In Kagera, Maystadt
and Verwimp (2009) found that 30 percent of healthcare receivers form relief agencies were
Tanzanians. These benefits; however, are usually limited to locals who live closest to the camps
(Whitaker 2002). Benefitting “the local community through improvements in infrastructure in
the areas of water, health, roads, etc.” is one of the measures the UNHCR encourages to prevent
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tension between refugees and local populations (UNHCR 1999, 19). Sometimes, the presence of
refugees is extremely beneficial to locals to the extent that it makes aid agencies more likely to
build new facilities and improve the old ones fulfilling a “wish list including all the development
projects that the [host’s] administration could not afford on its own” (Jacobsen 2002, 583).
As the literature shows, the economic impact of refugees is conditional. Chambers (1986)
argued that refugee presence creates “winners and losers” in host regions; the winners could be
the local farmers who own land and hire refugees for lower wages to increase their profits; and
the losers are local workers who lose their jobs to refugees. Often, the presence of refugees may
have the potential to create inflation, poverty, and even environmental degradation (Jacobsen
1997). At the same time, self-settled refugees may increase the capacity of the host communities
through augmenting local and regional trade and creating a ‘multiplier effect’ (Jacobsen 2002).
The economic impact of refugees on the host state is significant when it comes to
explaining the spread of conflicts. The literature shows that slow economic growth and high
poverty are the main determinants of insurgency and its prevalence (Collier and Hoeffler 2000;
Fearon and Laitin 2001; Sesay 2004). The presence of refugees makes the least fortunate
segment of the host economy worse off (Chambers 1986), may reduce the per capita income of
the host population, and decreases the cost of fighting for local populations (Murdoch and
Sandler 2002). Hence, if refugees have a negative economic impact, then violence is more likely
to spread.
While the literature explains the relationship between economic factors and the spread of
conflict, it does not explicitly state the conditions that make refugee presence an economic asset
in one host state and a burden in another. This is not only significant for the host economy, but
also the likelihood to experience conflict; if refugees are an economic benefit, then their presence
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is less likely to increase the conflict onset, and vice versa. Since the literature shows that refugee
precarity, which alters ethnic, economic, and political dynamics in the host state is the cause of
violence spillover, alleviating their economic hardship lowers the risk of violence. In fact, host
states have the power to mitigate this relationship through policies and laws regulating refugees
(Banki 2013b).

Host State Policies
If the human capital of refugees is high, then the host might benefit substantially from
their presence (Sesay 2004, Jacobsen 2005). However, this is only possible when host regimes
facilitate economic integration of refugees and utilize their capacities. Through policies and
regulations, host states have the power to integrate refugees into their economy and offset
security risks.
Jacobsen (2005) argues that host states should focus on integrating refugees into their
economy instead of focusing their efforts on repatriating them. This is especially true since civil
wars are increasing in duration, which means refugees are likely to remain displaced for longer
periods. She further argues that economic integration is constrained by three factors: the physical
environment and location of refugee camps, 2) access to arable land, and 3) freedom of
movement. These factors ease the transition of refugee economy from the informal sector to the
formal sector, where the host government can practice its legislative and tax capacities. When
these three factors are in favor of refugees, they become less dependent on aid from the host
government, lowering the probability of violence spillover.
Given the available data, in this study, I will consider two factors that determine refugee
integration into the local economy: freedom of movement and residence, and the right to earn a
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livelihood. These two variables indicate the extent to which refugees are able to gain a living
outside the camp. When refugees are not allowed to leave the camps, they are less likely to
sustain an independent livelihood. Similarly, if they are not allowed to work legally, then they
are likely to engage in illegal activities and suffer from exploitation and harassment, facilitating
the spread of conflicts and violence.

Freedom of Movement
Host states constrain refugee movement by forcing them to reside in camps. In 1998,
Kibreab proposed that to undermine the consequential security threat of hosting refugees,
receiving countries should keep refugees in remote areas where their basic needs are provided for
by the “international system.” Most host countries have adopted this argument claiming that
warehousing refugees is the optimal settlement choice to mitigate security and economic risks of
hosting (Jacobsen 2001). However, scholars in the literature evaluated Kibreab’s argument and
found that camps increase security threats through aggravating existing security problems and
creating new ones.
Most camps lack an effective system of law and order; hence, crimes go unpunished,
making them more likely fall to under the control of coercive groups that further deprive
refugees of their rights and subject them to intimidation and violence (Jacobsen 2001). Camps
are not only attractive sites for rebel groups, but they are also easy targets for raids and direct
attacks (Payne 1998; Leopold 2001). In fact, refugee camp culture and organization make them
suitable for intimidation and violence (Jacobsen 2001). Therefore, violence in camps is not only
expected from the state, or rebel groups, but also from teachers, humanitarian workers,
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community leaders, and even peacekeepers who employ violence to subject refugees to their
demands and to sexually assault women and children (Ferris 2007; Khattak 2007).
Even if a host takes serious measures to keep refugees within camps, refugees will move
out and engage in economic and social activities (Jacobsen 2005). Once they are outside the
camp; however, refugees will be moving in an illegal space, making them more likely to break
other laws. Hence, they will require more policing and will be at a higher risk of harassment
(Jacobsen 2001).
Host governments also make the claim that camps decrease competition between host
communities and refugee groups over employment opportunities. However, refugees and local
workers are not substitutable and refugee presence has little, or no impact, on the employability
of locals (Ottaviano and Peri 2012; Friedberg and Hunt 1995; Fakih and Ibrahim 2015).
Warehousing refugees also separates them from the local economy, especially that most camps
are located in remote border areas, and have no adequate access to transportation. Therefore,
camps deprive the economy from refugee remittances, entrepreneurial spirit, and human capital,
which have the potential to elevate the host economy. Furthermore, the absence of a governing
body in camps that can enforce law and order makes economic transactions riskier, which
discourages refugees and locals from engaging in economic activities and slows down economic
growth.
Warehousing hinders economic integration. Typically, camps have at least one market
where small enterprises are situated. In camps, almost all refugees participate in economic deals;
poor refugees trade food aid rations, goods that do not meet their needs and preferences, nonfood aid, and provide services for other refugees and humanitarian workers while wealthier
refugees trade goods including gold, diamond, and currencies. In addition, when refugees in
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camps demand some basic need, a service emerges to meet the demand. Prohibiting refugees
from moving freely and choosing where to live increases the cost of hosting and inhibits
potential economic benefits (Jacobsen 2005). It also obstructs any social interactions that may
decrease the likelihood of conflict between refugees and local groups.
Warehousing refugees increases both security and economic burdens for the host state.
Most of these camps are set up near the sending state’s borders; therefore, the host government
has to redirect significant resources to further protect its territory from cross-border attacks,
raids, and militant groups. In other words, camps increase the economic burden of hosting,
especially since refugees are far from the local economy. To offset the negative externalities of
camps, host governments redirect assets from other projects to maintain security and provide
humanitarian assistance. Consequently, local populations start to perceive refugees as an
economic burden that is depleting their scarce resources. This perception encourages conflict
between local populations and refugee groups.
Warehousing often leaves refugees’ essential economic, social, and psychological needs
unfulfilled (Derouen and Barutciski 2007), which lowers their cost of engaging in conflicts.
Camps also force host governments to redirect public resources into less sustainable and
inefficient projects. Furthermore, camps limit the exchange of ideas, human capital, goods,
services, and economic resources between locals and refugees, which lowers the cost of fighting
for locals. In sum, as Warner (2007, 209) states: “Refugee camps are ideally places of refuge and
security, but for some...they are places of continuing violence, isolation and disempowerment."

Hypothesis One: Host states that limit refugee ability to move freely are more likely to
experience violent conflicts.
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Sustaining a Livelihood
The 1951 Convention relating to refugees emphasizes freedom of employment as a
refugee right. In denying this right, host regimes claim to pursue protectionist policies that aim to
decrease competition for employment opportunities between locals and refugees. However,
refugees often work in camps, occupy jobs that locals are not willing to take, and work for
humanitarian organizations. Even when they compete with locals, most of their employment
does not affect local workers’ employability. Studies have shown that refugees have no
significant, or at least modest, impact on employment prospects for native workers (Friedberg
and Hunt 1995; D’Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri 2010; Fakih and Ibrahim 2015).
The right to earn a livelihood has a significant economic impact on host states. Refugee
employment positively affects the host’s economic development. With the help of the UNHCR,
Greece, for example, employed 1.5 million refugees in underdeveloped regions and dramatically
transferred old farming practices into more economically efficient methods that increased the
country’s produce remarkably (Betts and Collier 2015). Tanzania, as well, hired refugee workers
for development projects and included them in its development strategy (Daley 1989; Chaulia
2003). Similar success stories can be found in Uganda, Burundi, and Congo (Betts and Collier
2015). Furthermore, some refugees are entrepreneurs and investors who can move their
enterprises to the host country and create jobs not only for refugees, but also for local workers. In
the current Syrian refugee case, reallocating businesses to host countries can also decrease the
tax base for Assad’s regime and the duration of the ongoing Syrian civil war, which may spread
to neighboring countries (Betts and Collier 2015).
Legal employment also decreases security risks. The combination of economic losses
refugees experience when they escape their home states and precarity in camps lowers their cost
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to engage in conflicts (Salehyan 2007). Hence, rebel groups attract refugees because they give
them a ‘sense of purpose’ and levitate their standard of living (Salehyan 2007). Sustaining a
livelihood would also make them less likely to return to their country of origin and participate in
the conflict there (Betts and Collier 2015), which makes host countries less prone to conflicts.
When allowed to work, trade, and run businesses, refugees become less likely to engage in
illegal alternatives to generate a sustainable livelihood.
Through legal employment, host states can also raise the cost of fighting. Since the
incentives to fight and joining rebel groups are economic, allowing refugees to raise their
standards of living through economic integration should increase their cost of fighting and repel
them from joining rebel groups. Most important, when refugees have the ability to sustain a
livelihood, host states will need to allocate fewer assets to support refugees. This will offset local
population’s perception that refugees are an economic burden and similarly decrease their cost of
fighting. The ability to sustain a livelihood gives refugees a stake in the host country and
integrates them in the local economy, making both parties less likely engage in conflict because
of their interdependent economic interests.

Hypothesis Two: Host states that limit refugee ability to sustain a livelihood are more likely to
experience violent conflicts.
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Chapter Three: Methodology
In the previous chapter, I hypothesized that host countries that constrain refugee freedom
of movement and work are more susceptible to experience conflicts. To determine whether the
aforementioned conditional variables significantly impact the dependent variable, I carry out a
large N statistical analysis research design. In this chapter, I present my hypothesized model and
expected outcome, explain the methodological approach, operationalize the variables, and
discuss the control measures.

Hypothesis and Expected Outcomes
As “Figure 1” below illustrates, I hypothesize that conflicts are more likely to spread to
host countries that restrict refugee ability to move and work.

Figure 1: Hypothesized Model
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Statistical analysis
Statistical analysis is the most appropriate research methodology for this study because it
can determine if the conditional variables have significant effect on the dependent variable using
a large number of cases, which makes the findings more generalizable. If the relationship exists,
regression tests will also determine the magnitude of the relationship and its causal direction.

Operationalization of Variables
Independent Variable: Presence of Refugees
Who is a refugee has become an increasingly important question, not only in the
literature, but also for policy makers. Migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers, and even movers are
used interchangeably, even though the political and economic implications of each category is
associated with different economic costs and political calculations. This study only considers
refugees, using the UNHCR’s definition: “[a person] owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear,
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country" (UNHCR 1951, 6). The vast
majority of studies on refugees adopted this definition (Shacknove 1985). Since 2007, the
definition expanded to include persons in refugee-like situations “who are outside their country
or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom
refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained” (UNHCR 2013).
Moreover, in accordance with the literature on contiguity of conflicts, I only consider
host countries that had refugees from neighboring states. The literature distinguishes between
refugees from neighboring states and refugees from abroad in terms of security risks, economic
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impact, and ethnic links. As for security risks, refugees from neighboring states are more prone
to experience violence from sending governments given the geographical proximity. They are
also more likely to bring in arms and mobilize in host states. Moreover, lingual and cultural
proximities between neighboring countries ease the integration of refugees; therefore, their
impact on the host economy will differ accordingly. Refugees from abroad are also less likely to
share ethnic and religious ties with locals, which impacts how they are perceived in the host
community. All these factors affect the extent to which refugees are integrated into the host
economy and, as previously hypothesized, their impact on the spread of conflicts. To determine
which host states are neighboring countries, I use Gleditsch and Ward minimum distance
database, which defines them as countries whose borders fall within a distance of 100 kilometers.

Conditional Variables:
To measure refugee ability to move freely and sustain a livelihood, I use data from the
United States Committee on Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI). For 2007-2009, the Committee
published an annual report card that grades countries on a scale from A to F (excluding E, and
with A being the highest possible grade) on Freedom of Movement and Residence,
Detention/Access to Courts, Refoulement/Physical Detention, and the Right to Earn a Livelihood.
The ‘Refugee Rights Report Card’ is part of the Committee’s annual World Refugee Survey, a
larger report that discusses hosting conditions and policies in details for the largest 60 host
countries for each year. When a host country had refugee groups from different sending
countries and subjected them to different employment and movement policies, the Committee
graded each country according to the rights enjoyed by the ‘least-favored’ group. For statistical
purposes, I converted the alphabetical grades into a numerical scale ranging from 1 to 5 (where 5
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is the highest possible score). Finally, “Table 1” illustrates the Committee’s scale for the
variables in the report card.

Grade

Policy

5 or A

No restrictions in policy or practice

4 or B

Almost no restriction in policy or practice

3 or C

Restrictions in policy but wide toleration in practice

2 or D

Restrictions in policy and practice; harassment

1 or F

Severe restriction in policy and practice
Table 1: USCRI Scale

To grade each host country policies, I use Committee’s criteria, which consists of the following
questions in “Table 2.”

Freedom of Movement

Right to Sustain a Livelihood

Did the government confine refugees or

Did the government allow refugees or asylum

asylum seekers to camps or segregated

seekers to work and practice professions

settlements?

legally?
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Could they travel freely throughout the

Did refugees enjoy the protection of labor

national territory and reside where they

legislation on par with nationals?

chose?

Did authorities tie aid to encampment?

Could they legally engage in business and
obtain all necessary licenses?

Did refugees have access to international

Could refugees open bank accounts and

travel documents (other than for resettlement

acquire, hold title to, and transfer business

or return)?

premises, farmland, homes, or other capital
assets?
Table 2: USCRI Criteria

To generate a more representative dataset, I graded the rights of refugees for 2005 and
2006 using the same criteria. First, I regarded the countries for 2007-09 using the same indicators
and scale to understand how the committee graded each country. Then, I used the same method
to grade host countries between 2005 and 2009.

Implemented Variables
While coding the reports, I realized that there was a clear gap between the Committee’s
scale, which mainly considers host state policies, and the actual implementation of these policies.
This contradiction is important since the mere policy does not capture the extent to which
refugees could move and work freely. Therefore, I created a modified scale for each conditional
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variable and listed the indicators for the implemented movement variable in “Table 3” and for
the implemented livelihood variable in “Table 4” below. In rare cases the implementation of
these policies was more tolerant toward refugee rights than the policy, in those cases I upgraded
the host’s grade by a half point. When there was no noticeable difference between the policies
and their implementation, I did not change the grade. Finally, when the implementation was
more restrictive than the actual policies, which was the case in the vast majority of the reports, I
downgraded the grade by a half point.

Police officers controlled their movement, extorted bribes from them, or harassed
them, or asked for documents not required by law;
Refugees did not report receiving passports or travel documents;
Movement conditions were difficult for the entire population;
There were unclear procedures to issue documents;
Non-state actors controlled the movement;
Authorities not familiar with UNHCR documents;
Refugees are allowed to travel, but cannot return;
Table 3: Implemented Movement Indicators
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Refugees were not able to access the justice system;
Employers did not know it was legal for refugees to work;
There was a wage ceiling for refugees or they received lower wages in general;
Refugees allowed to work inside camps, but not outside;
Refugees allowed to work, but not in certain sectors;
Procedures for legal employment were difficult or unclear;
Refugees had to pay high fees, or license costs, to work legally;
Refugees were not able to access the justice system;
There were no specific policies and/or undefined terms;
Refugees were not treated more favorably than other foreigners in employment;
Table 4: Implemented Livelihood Indicators

Dependent Variable: Spread of Conflict
Previous studies looked at the relationship between refugees and civil wars (Salehyan and
Gleditsch 2006). The presence of refugees, however, may lead to other kinds of political
violence, including individual attacks, battles, raids, riots, and even wars. In addition, the
arbitrary threshold of 1,000 battle deaths, or even 25 battle deaths, is integral in understanding
the severity of a conflict, not its mere presence, which is the focus of this study. Therefore, I do
not distinguish between the different types of conflicts because I aim to capture any refugeerelated violence in host countries. To determine the number of deaths, I use the UCDP/PRIO
Armed Conflict Dataset.
Finally, the policies under investigation in this study may take time to have an impact on
both refugees and host communities, I expect conflicts to occur not in the same year as the
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graded policy, but the year after. Therefore, I lagged the independent and conditional variables
by a year to control for the temporal order of the relationship.

Control Measures
In addition to the variables discussed earlier, the literature provides a wide array of
factors that may also impact the hypothesized relationship. I include these variables in my study
to control for their effect on the dependent variable.
One of these variables is transnational ethnic ties which may facilitate the diffusion of
conflicts across borders (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). However, diversity does not necessarily
lead to conflicts. Rather, the degree to which different ethnic groups are polarized makes
conflicts more likely. Therefore, I control for this variable using Marta Reynal-Querol’s dataset
on ethnic and religious fractionalization and polarization. Each country is given a score between
0 and 1, based on World Christian Encyclopedia data, depending on their ethnic distribution.
Violent conflicts are also more likely to spread to less affluent states (Fearon and Laitin
2003; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008). In essence, wealthy countries are less likely to experience
political violence because they have stronger security establishments, better infrastructure and
administrative capacities, and more resources to curb economic grievances and mobilization
(Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Thus, I control for this variable using the real GDP per capita
index from the Kristian Gleditsch Expanded Trade and GDP dataset. Additionally, since the
study controls for refugee employability in a host country, it is necessary to consider the host’s
unemployment rate. For this variable, I use the World Bank dataset.
A country’s level of democracy is another factor that influences its conflict onset (Hegre,
Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch 2001; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008). On the one hand, democratic
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states may allow nonviolent means of protest while autocracies may repress any opposition. To
control for this variable, I use the modified Polity IV dataset, a scale ranging from -10 (least
democratic) to 10 (democratic).
Previous studies also controlled for the size of refugee population, considering it an
important factor affecting the economy and security of host states (Salehyan and Gleditsch
2006). In this study, I create a ratio variable to control for both refugee population and host
population using the USCRI data on refugee influxes divided by the total population, using
Kristian Gleditsch’s Expanded Trade and GDP dataset. Additionally, host countries in the same
region are more likely to share social, political, and economic characteristics that impact the
relationship. Therefore, I include the region of each host country in the dataset.
Finally, the UNHCR’s 1951 Refugee Convention and the Refugee Protocol of 1967,
which emphasize refugee rights and host states obligations, may also indicate the host’s
willingness to relax refugee-related policies. The 1951 and 1967 conventions signatories are also
more likely to receive aid from humanitarian missions including the UNHCR, which in return
gives these organizations a role in managing refugee livelihoods in host countries. Therefore, I
add a dichotomous variable controlling for the ratification of these conventions using USCRI
reports.
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Chapter Four: Data & Analysis
In this section, I will first introduce the dataset and discuss specific cases that I excluded
from the study. Then, I will describe the data that I have collected and coded, which is available
in “Appendix 1.” Additionally, I will discuss the statistical and quantitative operations. Finally, I
will present the findings, interpret them, and draw upon cases from the reports that demonstrate
the statistical findings of the study.

World Refugee Survey
Between 2005 and 2009, the USCRI published 237 host country reports. These reports
provide demographic information about each host country (including population size, number of
refugees, sending state, GDP, and whether the host has ratified the 1951 Convention and the
1967 Refugee Protocol). Additionally, these reports discussed refugee rights in host countries,
such as freedom of movement and residence, and right to sustain a livelihood.
Since refugees are the core focus of this study, reports about countries that had both
refugees and asylum seekers and did not distinguish between the two were excluded. Some
reports oversimplified certain issues. For example, the Committee’s reports combined both the
Occupied Palestinian Territories and Israel without distinguishing between internally displaced
persons and refugees, which affects their ability to move and work under the Palestinian
authorities and the Israeli government. In other instances, there were were missing reports for
some host countries, such as Turkey in 2007 and Liberia in 2006. At the same time, few reports
did not include the right to work and movement in their discussions. Therefore, I excluded those
reports. Finally, the total number of cases I coded was 198.
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Right to Sustain a Livelihood
Host state policies regarding refugee livelihood averaged 3.314 out of 5. According to the
USCRI scale this grade is closest to: Restrictions in policy but wide toleration in practice. This is
true in some cases, where host countries had strict regulations that curtailed refugee ability to
work, and at the same time they successfully implemented these polices, but with toleration. The
Committee’s scale; however, does not differentiate between restrictive work policies and actual
practice on the ground, where refugees were allowed to work, but they were exploited, harassed,
and abused. Finally, the Committee’s scores lacked a systematic definition that would fully
capture the degree of “wide toleration.”
In the reports and statistical analysis, I found that most countries did not fully implement
refugee-related policies according to their official policies and that they were more restrictive
than tolerant. Using the modified version of the work variable, I could more closely capture the
actual implementation of these polices and their impact on refugee ability to sustain a livelihood.
Between 2005 and 2009, only three instances had more tolerant practices, 51 had no difference
between practice and policy, and 154 had more restrictive practices than their policies. The
average for the implemented right to sustain a livelihood variable was 2.949.
When comparing the mere policy versus its implemented version, the latter is lower. In
other words, on average, refugees were more constrained in their ability to to sustain a livelihood
than the actual policies that were in place. The gap between the USCRI’s variable and the
modified variable represents the weakness of refugee-related policy implementation.
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Right to Movement and Residence
Similarly, I coded 198 reports for 56 countries regarding movement and residence
freedom, or host state policies that allow refugees to move freely and choose where to live. The
overall average for movement was 3.693 out of 5, which according to USCRI criteria is closest
to: Almost no restriction in policy or practice. However, the Committee’s scale for this variable
too does not reflect the practical restrictions on movement and solely depends on categorizing
host state policies. Therefore, I created a modified variable for movement that included the
implementation of these policies. For this variable, two instances only had more tolerant practice
than the actual policy, 55 instances had no difference between the two variables, and 141
instances had worse practice than the actual policy. The average for the modified variable was
3.342.
For this variable, as well, host states scored higher, on average, when I only considered
the policies. However, by accounting for the implementation of these policies, I found that, on
average, refugees were more constrained in terms of their movement and choice of residence
because host states did not fully implement their policies.

Spread of Conflicts
As hypothesized earlier, host countries whose policies limit refugee ability to move and
work freely are more likely to experience conflicts. To account for these conflicts, I used the
Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset, which includes all types of
organized political violence and provides an annual battle death count for each country. Since the
dataset provides different death estimates for each incident, I used the dataset’s “best estimate,”
which gives the most likely estimate of total fatalities resulting from a single event. Additionally,
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to account for the impact of refugee presence on battle deaths, I controlled for three years of
previous violence. Finally, the total number of deaths for these countries between 2005 and 2009
was 65,228 deaths, “Figure 2” below illustrates the regional distribution of these deaths1.

Figure 2: Percentage of Total Deaths by Region (2005-2009)

Temporal Order
The two hypotheses in this study predict that restrictive employment and movement
policies would decrease the host population’s economic wellbeing and consequently increase
political violence. For refugee presence to cause changes in social, political, and economic
factors to cause grievances and change cost-benefit calculations, this needs time. Therefore, we
do not expect the rise in battle deaths to happen in the same year as the dependent and
conditional variables. Given that the data is by country/year, I lagged the conditional variables
and the independent variables by one year.

1

For regional distributions in this study, Africa does not include North African countries;
instead, they are considered part of the MENA region.
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Statistical Analysis
To determine which regression models would best capture the relationship
between the variables in the study, I first ran a correlation test that included all the the
study’s variables. Correlation finds which variables are systematically related. In other
words, it is the association between variables. This association; however, does not
necessarily imply causation (Johnson and Reynolds 2012).
“Table 5” below illustrates correlations that were greater than 0.33 and lower
than -0.33. First, the movement and work policies were highly correlated with their
modified versions because the difference between the two variables can be either zero or
0.5 points. Second, there is high positive correlation between ratification of the 1967
Protocol and the lagged USCRI movement, lagged USCRI work, and lagged
implemented work variables. Finally, the region variable is highly negatively correlated
with the USCRI work and movement variables, and their implemented versions.
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Variable 1

Variable 2

Correlation
Coefficients

Convention

Lagged Ratio

-0.3924

Lagged Population

Violence

0.4179

Lagged Number of

1951 Convention

-0.4148

Polity2

Lagged Number of Refugees

-0.4046

Protocol

Lagged USCRI Movement

0.3548

Protocol

Lagged USCRI Work

0.3504

Protocol

Lagged Implemented Work

0.3624

Protocol

Lagged Number of Refugees

-0.3838

Protocol

Lagged Ratio

-0.3630

Protocol

Region

-0.4896

Region

Lagged USCRI Movement

-0.3968

Region

Lagged Implemented

-0.4087

Refugees

Movement
Region

Lagged USCRI Work

-0.4623

Region

Lagged Implemented Work

-0.4584

Region

Lagged Population

0.5314

Region

1951 Convention

-0.3598

Table 5: Strongly Correlated Variables and Coefficients
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Regional Distribution
As “Table 5” illustrates, the region of a host country matters. The regional
variable is strongly correlated with host state policies and implementation patterns.
Therefore, this variable will affect the regression models. To control for the regional
impact, I ran different regression models with and without the region variable.
The question, however, is why does it matter? For one reason, the sample only
considers neighboring host countries, which are also suffering from neighboring conflicts
that increase their conflict onsets (see Murdoch and Sandler 2002 for economic impact of
conflicts on neighboring countries). Second, there are certain social, political, and
economic ties that also affect a regime’s willingness to integrate refugees. For example,
out of the 54 African countries, only 5 did not sign or ratify the African Refugee
Convention, which demands host countries to provide refugees with travel documents
(Article 4). This convention is significant to this study since, as the “Figure 3” and
“Figure 4,” illustrate the African continent was the source and host for most refugees in
2005 and 2009.

Figure 3: Refugee Population by Region in 2005

Figure 4: Refugee Population by Region in 2009
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Finally, to understand how host countries within each region integrated refugees,
we need to consider the relationship through a regional perspective. As “Figure 5”
illustrates, the African continent was second in terms of allowing refugees to work and
move. What is important to notice here is that Sub-Saharan Africa scored second overall
although it had the largest number of host countries. Again, this calls attention to the
African Refugee Convention, which requires host states to “issue to refugees lawfully
staying in their territories travel documents in accordance with the United Nations [1951
refugee] Convection” (Article 6). The African Refugee Convention also emphasized the
implementation of these policies and required host states to provide periodical data
regarding “(a) the condition of refugees; (b) the implementation of this Convection, and
(c) laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force relating to
refugees” (Article 7).

Figure 5: Regional Report Card 2005-2009
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Regression
An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is not the most suitable statistical
approach for this study since the relationship between the independent variable and the
dependent variable is nonlinear. Additionally, one of the underlying assumptions of OLS
is the normal distribution of the data, which is not true for the dependent variable,
number of deaths (Krain 1997).
Given nature of the dependent variable being a count of events, number of deaths,
the study requires an event-count regression model. The simplest form of event-count
model is Poisson regression; however, this model is also inappropriate for this study since
it considers events to be independent. In this study, the events are dependent; countries
that had one killing are more likely to have more battle deaths relative to countries that
had none. Poisson models also assume that the mean of the dependent variable is equal to
the variance, which is not the case in this study. Therefore, Poisson regression is also
inappropriate for this study. (King 1989; Krain 1997)
Finally, the most appropriate methodological approach is Negative Binomial
regression, which best fits the dataset and meets the requirements. I ran three different
regression tests. The first regression model included both lagged movement and work
using the USCRI scale, level of democracy, lagged real GDP per capita, lagged ratio of
refugees to host population, lagged unemployment level, geographical region, ethnic
fractionalization, and the 1967 Refugee Protocol. Neither the work policy variable, nor
the movement policy variable had a P-values less than 0.05, therefore, I fail to reject the
two null hypotheses. In other words, there is no significant relationship between these
two independent variables and the dependent variable. Meanwhile, region, lagged GDP
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per capita, ethnic fractionalization, and ratification of 1967 protocol had significant
impact on the dependent variable.
In the second model, I kept the same variables and replaced the work and
movement policies with their lagged modified versions. Again, region, lagged GDP per
capita, ethnic fractionalization, and lagged unemployment rate were significant. This
time; however, the implemented movement variable was also significant.
Given the high correlation between the regional location of host states and the
independent variables in this study, the third model excluded the region variable. As
“Table 6” below illustrates, the lagged ratio of refugees to population, lagged
unemployment rate, and implemented movement were all significant variables in the
relationship.
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------(Model 1)
(Model 2)
(Model 3)
violence
violence
violence
------------------------------------------------------------------------------Violence
Lagged USCRI Movement

-0.234
(-0.43)

Lagged USCRI Work

-0.106
(-0.23)

Polity2

0.0258
(0.36)

-0.00898
(-0.12)

Region

2.611***
(3.41)

2.189**
(3.02)

Lagged Real GDP/Cap

-0.000343**
(-2.88)

-0.000301**
(-2.64)

-0.000155
(-1.82)

Lagged Refugee Ratio

-24.56
(-1.04)

-39.18
(-1.71)

-68.40**
(-2.76)

Lagged Unemployment

0.155
(1.62)

0.247*
(2.39)

0.236*
(2.07)

Ethnic Fractionalization

3.651*
(2.50)

3.975**
(2.70)

2.580
(1.74)

1967 Refugee Protocol

4.217*
(2.57)

2.499
(1.43)

-1.778
(-1.77)

Lagged Implemented Movement

-1.025*
(-2.00)

-1.225*
(-2.28)

Lagged Implemented Work

0.563
(1.12)

0.618
(1.14)

_cons

-16.32*
(-2.40)

-12.63
(-1.93)

-0.0769
(-0.97)

6.674***
(3.81)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------lnalpha
_cons
1.850***
1.831***
1.914***
(12.22)
(12.05)
(12.62)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------N
96
97
97
------------------------------------------------------------------------------t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 6: Regression Models
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Interpreting the Models
Regression gives a coefficient for each variable. In negative binomial regression,
the product of the coefficient and the mean of the dependent variable gives the effect of
each variable on the dependent variable. For example, in the third model, a one-unit
increase in the modified movement variable decreases total annual deaths by about 420
deaths. On the other hand, a 1% increase in host state’s unemployment increases deaths
by around 81 deaths. The three tables below illustrate the coefficients for the significant
variables from each regression model. While regression provides coefficients for all
variables, the only ones that are important to the study are those that were significant
theoretically and empirically.
Variable

Coefficient

Effect

Region

2.611294

896.0506517

Lagged Real GDP Per Capita

-0.0003427

-0.1175955516

Ethnic Fractionalization

3.651352

1252.940626

Protocol

4.217165

1447.096132

Table 7: Regression Model 1

Variable

Coefficient

Effect

Region

2.189019

751.1493924

Lagged Real GDP Per Capita

-0.0003011

-0.1033207487

Ethnic Fractionalization

3.974607

1363.863737

Lagged Unemployment

0.2467033

84.65483119

Lagged Movement Modified

-1.024897

-351.6875636

Table 8: Regression Model 2
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Variable

Coefficient

Effect

Lagged Ratio of refugees to

-68.4046

-23472.64858

Lagged Movement Modified

-1.2246

-420.2145098

Lagged Unemployment

0.2358709

80.93775487

host population

Table 9: Regression Model 3

As “Table 9” illustrates, the ratio of refugees to local population has a significant impact
on the spread of violence because the more refugees a host country has received relative to the
size of its population, the more resources it has to reallocate for humanitarian aid, security, and
infrastructure. Similarly, unemployment level is another significant variable because it is an
indicator of the host economy’s strength and ability to function under influxes of refugees. Most
important, there is a significant relationship between refugee ability to move freely and the
spread of violence. To understand how this relationship is carried out, I include the following
examples from the repertoire of cases I coded.
As the reports demonstrate, some host countries did no have policies regulating refugee
ability to move and work. While Bangladesh, for example, does not have an official policy that
defines the nature of refugee movement, the Constitution of 1972 enables the government to
impose “any restrictions” to control the movement and residence of foreigners and refugees
alike, which enables local authorities to limit refugee movement and residence arbitrarily
(USCRI 2008, par 13). In April 2008, the authorities demanded local Bangladeshis to evict
Rohingya refugees from their houses and not lease them space; this announcement came after
officials denied issuing refugee cards, compensating them for their work, and marrying them
(USCRI 2008, par 17). This lack of systematic official policies creates an environment where
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authorities can exploit, assault, and extort bribes from refugees. In Chad, for example, which also
lacks a legal code regulating refugee movement, the government required refugees to obtain
safe-conduct passes to leave their camps; therefore, authorities had the power to arbitrarily deny
issuing and renewing passes, and officials at checkpoints demanded bribes from refugees
(USCRI 2009, par 17). Refugees, who lack official documents, are prone to arbitrary detention
harassment, and are incapable of their running their quotidian activities and affairs.
The lack of documents, or perceiving them as “invalid,” precludes refugee ability to
sustain a livelihood. In Guinea, for example, employers refused to hire refugees because they
could not recognize their documents (USCRI 2009, par 10). Similarly, in Kenya, where the
constitution guarantees every person in the country the right to movement and work, refugees
could not own or transfer property because they lacked documentation (USCRI 2006, par 11).
Employers in South Africa, as well, refused to hire refugees because their documents were not
the same color as the official documents for South Africans, forcing refugees with advanced
degrees to resort to informal entry-level positions although the Refugee Act granted them the
right to work (USCRI 2008, par 18). The inability to recognize refugee documents was also
present in China, where police officers outside North Korean refugee camps were not familiar
with UNHCR documents and did not allow them to travel (USCRI 2008, par 11).
The lack of documentation also eases refugee exploitation. In Chad, refugees had the
right to run business and work; however, some Sudanese refugees reported that “landowners
confiscated the property just before harvest and claimed the [oral] contract was void” (USCRI
2007, par 17). In Guinea, as well, employers did not recognize Liberian refugee foreign
credentials, which allowed authorities to impose unfair taxes on their businesses (USCRI 2009,
par 16). The lack of documentations also precludes refugee ability to open bank accounts and
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limits their access to credit. In south Africa, prior to 2006, refugees could not receive their
compensations because they could not open bank accounts (USCRI 2007, par 26).
While some host governments have policies that relax refugee ability to move, external
factors precluded their implementation. For example, although Pakistan allows refugees to move
freely, in March 2007, when President George Bush visited Pakistan, local authorizes banned
refugee movement outside the camps and arrested the 150 refugees who left the camps on that
day (USCRI 2007, par 12). In India, as well, police forces attacked Tibetan refugees, who
previously could move freely, to prevent them from visiting New Delhi to participate in the
Tibetan Uprising Day (USCRI 2005, par 9). Additionally, the general insecurity in Iraq during
the 2003 War made Palestinian refugees, who used to move freely, vulnerable to harassment,
violent attacks, and arbitrary detention (USCRI 2007, par 12).
As the regression models demonstrate, limiting refugee movement increases violence in
host countries. On the one hand, when refugees cannot move freely and are limited to the
resources they have inside and around camps, they exhaust these limited resources, giving rise to
conflicts between them and local populations. In Nepal, for example, refugees and locals fought
over the limited firewood near the camps (USCRI 2005, par 4). Similarly, the Chadian
government warehoused refugees in camps and left them with very limited land and natural
resources that they had to compete over with locals, consequently Chadians “destroyed their
wells due to competition for wood, water, and grazing land” (USCRI 2007, par 15). The inability
to move freely also indicates that the majority of local populations are not aware of the situation
within the camps; thus, while in reality refugees would be living in harsh economic conditions,
locals may perceive them as free-riders who receive unfair aid. In Yemen, for example, local
populations, “who believed the refugees have better facilities than they do,” escalated violence
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against refugees, which even further restricted refugee movement and the authorities only
allowed outsiders with military escorts to enter the camps (USCRI 2007, par 15). Curtailing
freedom of movement leads to violence is because when refugees leave camps illegally, they
become more prone to violence from local communities. In Zambia, for example, refugees from
Angola and the DRC did not report rapes and robberies fearing imprisonment (USCRI 2005, par
9). Finally, the state apparatus may coerce refugees into not moving and force them to work for
profit. One of the most appalling cases that demonstrates this notion was in Thailand, where
authorities denied Padaung refugees the right to move and travel to Canada, which provided
them resettlement, as they were considered “tourist attractions because of the brass coils they
wear on their elongated necks” and businesses profited from their immobility (USCRI 2009, par
12).
On the other hand, host states that allowed refugees to move freely benefitted from their
presence. In Benin, for example, which allowed refugees to move freely around the country and
choose where to reside, Togolese refugees planted land along the coast with high-quality
produce, which created jobs for both refugees and previously unemployed Beninese (USCRI
2006, par 10). Similarly, in the Mayukwayukwa and Meheba regions in Zambia, authorities gave
a special permission to refugees to cultivate land; as a result, refugees no longer needed food
rations from the government and sold the surplus in local markets (USCRI 2005, par 6).
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Chapter Five: Conclusion
The purpose of this Independent Study was to explore the relationship between refugee
economic integration and conflict spillovers. Specifically, I researched the role of movement and
work restrictions in mitigating the spread of conflicts to host countries. I reviewed the literature
and found that no previous studies have tested these hypotheses. I argued that host countries that
ease refugee movement and work are less likely to experience conflicts. Then, to empirically test
my argument, I coded 198 reports on host country policies and ran three regression models.

Findings
The findings of the study depend on the operationalization of the conditional variables. I
coded the data in the first regression model using the USCRI scale. In that model, I failed to
rejected the two null hypotheses. In the second and third models, where I used a revised version
of the scale that included the implementation of the two conditional variables, freedom of
movement and residence was statistically significant.
Refugee movement directly influences living conditions in the host country for refugees
and local populations. Previous studies have demonstrated that warehousing refugees in camps
increases security threats (Payne 1998; Leopold 2001; Jacobsen 2001) and makes refugees
vulnerable to violence (Ferris 2007; Khattak 2007; Warner 2007). As the regression models
demonstrate, the absence of recognizable documentation, harassment, bribe extortion, unclear
procedures, lack of control over territories, and arbitrary detention also have an effect on
movement, and should be considered in the data. Failure of implementation leaves refugees
vulnerable to unjust regulations and violence from both the government and local populations. In
other instances, movement constraints ignite conflicts between refugees and local groups over
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the distribution of resources. Not having the right to move and reside also cripples refugee
employability and engagement in trade deals, which further aggravates the host population and
economy. By taking these factors into consideration, we can better understand the relationship
between refugee rights and a host state’s conflict onset.
Limitations
For this study, I used the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants Annual
World Refugee Survey. This report; however, was suspended in 2009, which limited my ability
to investigate more relevant cases. Additionally, some reports simplified complex hosting
conditions. Furthermore, the Committee’s scale does not fully capture the implementation of
these policies, which I found to have a significant impact on the spread of conflicts. To better
understand the relationship between refugees and conflict spillover, we need more specific data
on refugee-related violence that not only considers national battle deaths, but also violence
around the camps and refugee-concentrated areas. There is also a need for more robust
systematic data on other constraints the preclude refugee economic integration beyond the scope
of this study, such as refugee access to courts, coercive repatriation, and access to credit.

Implications
This study has demonstrated that freedom of movement plays a significant role in the
spread of violence to host countries. Through implementing this policy, host states can mitigate
the spread of violence. Chad, which limited refugee movement and suffered from clashes
between local groups and refugees over limited resources within camp regions, is a classic
example for how freedom of movement impacts violence. This suggests that researchers,
practitioners, and, most important, host governments must pay more attention not only to
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drafting policies that ease refugee movement and economic integration, but also implementing
that right. Regional cooperation and agreements also have an impact on refugee rights and the
spread of violence; therefore, they can mitigate the spread of violence through burden-sharing
and creating incentives for host states. Finally, the findings of this study help us better
understand the relationship between economic factors and other forms of political violence
related to marginalized groups, other than refugees.

Suggestions for Further Study
Earlier I explained the critical role of quantitative analysis in investigating the
relationship between refugee economic integration and violence. The statistical analysis;
however, includes a large number of cases, which limited my ability to focus on in-depth cases.
Therefore, future studies should take into consideration specific country cases to better
understand the complex causal mechanism between refugee presence and conflict spillovers.
After coding the reports, I also learned about the importance of other factors that are
interrelated to movement and economic integration. These factors include refugee access to
courts, lingual assistance, and education. Studies in the future should consider the impact of
these variables on the spread of violence.
Finally, studies should also consider the role of the state in polarizing its population
against refugees. Host states may invoke and instigate violence against refugees for political
gains. The role of the state in shaping its population’s perception of refugees should also be
considered in future investigations.

49

Bibliography
Banki, Susan. 2013a. “The Paradoxical Power of Precarity: Refugees and Homeland Activism.”
Refugee Review 1(1): 1-20.
Banki, Susan. 2013b. “Urbanity, Precarity, and Homeland Activism. Burmese Migrants in
Global Cities.” Moussons 22.
Black, Richard. 1994. “Forced Migration and Environmental Change: The Impact of Refugees
on Host Environments.” Journal of Environmental Management 42(1): 261-277.
Buhaug, Halvard, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2008. “Contagion or Confusion? Why
Conflicts Cluster in Space.” International Studies Quarterly 52(2): 215-233.
Chambers, Robert. 1986. “Hidden Losers? The Impact of Rural Refugees and Refugee Programs
On Poorer Hosts.” International Migration Review 20(2): 245-263.
Chaulia, Sreeram Sundar. 2003. “The Politics of Refugee Hosting in Tanzania: From
Open Door to Unsustainability, Insecurity and Receding Receptivity.” Journal of
Refugee Studies 16(2): 147-166.
Chen, Gregory. 2005. “A Global Campaign to End Refugee Warehousing.” World Refugee
Survey 2004 - Warehousing Issue, 21. Washington, DC: US Committee on Refugees.
Cleveland, William. 2000. A History of the Modern Middle East. 2nd ed. Boulder, Colo.:
Westview.
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford Economic
Papers—New Series 56(4): 563–95.
Collier, Paul. 2003. “Breaking The Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy.”
Washington D.C.: World Bank Publications.
Crisp, Jeff. 2002. “No Solutions in Sight: The Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations in
Africa.” Center for Comparative Immigration Studies.
http://eprints.cdlib.org/uc/item/89d8r34q#page-2 (accessed 12/1/2015).
D’Amuri, Francesco, Gianmarco IP Ottaviano, and Giovanni Peri. 2010. “The Labor Market
Impact of Immigration in Western Germany in the 1990s.” European Economic Review
54(4): 550–570.
Derouen Jr, Karl, and Michael Barutciski. 2007. “The Link Between Protracted Refugee
Situations and Civil War in Africa: Encouraging a New Direction for Research.” Civil
Wars 9(2): 214-225.

50
Dick, Shelly. 2002. “Liberians in Ghana: Living Without Humanitarian Assistance.” Working
Paper no. 57. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
European Commission. 2015. “Syria Crisis.” ECHO Factsheet.
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/syria_en.pdf (access 1/12/2016).
Fearon, James, and David Laitin. 2001. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” Presented at the
annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco.
Ferris, Elizabeth G. 2007. “Abuse of Power: Sexual Exploitation of Refugee Women and Girls.”
Signs 32(3):584-91.
Forsberg, Erika. 2008. “Polarization and Ethnic Conflict in a Widened Strategic Setting.”
Journal of Peace Research 45(2): 283–300.
Friedberg, Rachel M., and Jennifer Hunt. 1995. “The Impact of Immigrants on Host Country
Wages, Employment and Growth.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(2): 23–44.
Gerdes, Felix. 2006. “Forced Migration and Armed Conflict: An Analytical Framework and a
Case Study of Refugee-Warriors in Guinea.” Working Paper, University of Hamburg,
Research Unit of Wars, Armament and Development.
Gleditsch, Kristian S. 2007. "Transnational Dimensions of Civil War." Journal of Peace
Research 44(3): 293-309.
Gleditsch, Kristian S., and Michael D. Ward. 2001. “Measuring Space: A MinimumDistance Database and Applications to International Studies.” Journal of Peace
Research 38(6): 739-758.
Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2002. "Expanded trade and GDP Data." Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(5): 712-724.
Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and
Håvard Strand. 2002. “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” Journal of
Peace Research 39(5).
Gomez, Margarita Puerto, Christensen, Asger, Araya, Yonatan Yehdego, and Harild, Niels.
2010. “The Impacts of Refugees on Neighboring Countries: A Development Challenge.”
World Development Report background papers; 2011. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Halperin, Sandra. 1998. “The Spread of Ethnic Conflict in Europe: Some Comparative-Historical
Reflections.” In The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, ed. David A. Lake, and
Donald Rothchild. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

51
Hathaway, James. C. and Alexander Neve. 1997. “Making International Refugee Law Relevant
Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection.” Harvard Human
Rights Journal 10: 115-333.
Hegre, Håvard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2001. “Toward a
Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War 1816–1992.”
American Political Science Review 95(1): 33-48.
Human Rights Watch. 2014. “Lebanon: Rising Violence Targets Syrian Refugees.”
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/30/lebanon-rising-violence-targets-syrianrefugees (accessed 3/19/2016).
Human Rights Watch. 2016a. “I Just Wanted to be Treated like a Person.”
https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/01/12/i-just-wanted-be-treated-person/how-lebanonsresidency-rules-facilitate-abuse (accessed 3/21/2016).
Human Rights Watch. 2016b. Lebanon: Residency Rules Put Syrians at Risk.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/12/lebanon-residency-rules-put-syrians-risk
(accessed 3/21/2016).
Jacobsen, Karen. 1997. “Refugee's Environmental Impact: The Effect of Patterns of Settlement.”
Journal of Refugee Studies 10(1): 19-36.
Jacobsen, Karen. 2001. “The Forgotten Solution: Local Integration for Refugees in Developing
Countries.” UNHCR, Working Paper No. 45. http://www.unhcr.org/3b7d24059.html
(accessed 12/1/2015).
Jacobsen, Karen. 2002. “Can Refugees Benefit the State? Refugee Resources and African
Statebuilding.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 40(4): 577-596.
Jacobsen, Karen. 2005. The Economic Life of Refugees. Sterling: Kumarian Press.
Johnson, Janet Buttolph, Henry T. Reynolds, and Jason D. Mycoff. 2012. Political Science
Research Methods. Washington D.C.: Cq Press.
Khattak, Saba Gul. 2007. “Living on the Edges: Afghan Women and Refugee Camp
Management in Pakistan.” Signs 32(3): 575-79.
Kibreab, Gaim. 1989. “Local Settlements in Africa: A Misconceived Option?” Journal of
Refugee Studies 2(4): 468-490.
King, Gary. 1989. “Event Count Models for International Relation.” International Studies
Quarterly 33: 123-147.
Krain, Matthew. 1997. “State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of Genocides
and Politicides.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(3): 331-360.

52
Kullab, Samya. 2015. “Lebanese Law Forces Syrian Refugees Underground.” The Inside Story
on Emergencies (IRIN). www.irinnews.org/report/102181/lebanese-law-forces-syrianrefugees-underground (accessed 3/17/2016).
Kuran, Timur. 1998. “Ethnic Dissimilation and Its International Diffusion.” In The International
Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, ed. David A Lake and Ronald
Rothchild, 35-60. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Leopold, Mark. 2001. “Trying to Hold Things Together: International NGOs Caught up in an
Emergency in North-Western Uganda, 1996-97.” In The Charitable Impulse: NGOs &
Development in East & North-East Africa, ed. Ondine Barrow and Michael Jennings, 94108. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.
Lischer, Sarah Kenyon. 2006. Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and The
Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Loescher, Gil and James H. S. Milner. 2005. Protracted Refugee Situations: Domestic
and International Security Implications. Vol. 375. New York, NY: Taylor &
Francis.
Los Angeles Times. 1991. “Casualties of Mideast Wars.” Los Angeles Times.
http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-08/news/mn-2592_1_civil-war (accessed 21/1/2015).
Marshall, Monty G., Gurr, Ted R., and Jaggers Keith. 2014. “Political Regime
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013 Dataset.” Center for Systematic
Peace.
Maystadt, Jean-François, and Philip Verwimp. 2014. “Winners and Losers Among a RefugeeHosting Population.” Economic development and cultural change 62(4): 769-809.
Murdoch, James C., and Todd Sandler. 2002. “Economic Growth, Civil Wars, and Spatial
Spillovers.” Journal of conflict resolution 46(1): 91-110.
Murdoch, James C., and Todd Sandler. 2004. “Civil Wars and Economic Growth: Spatial
Dispersion.” American Journal of Political Science 48(1): 138–151.
Neilson, Brett, and Ned Rossiter. 2005. “From Precarity to Precariousness and Back Again:
Labour, Life and Unstable Networks.” Fibreculture (5).
O’Kane, Mary. 2007. “Blood, Sweat and Tears: The Political Agency of Women ActivistRefugees of Burma.” Intersections: Gender, History & Culture in the Asian Context 15:
1-10.
Organisation of African Unity. 1947. “Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa.” United Nations, Treaty Series No. 14691.

53
Payne, Lina. 1998. Rebuilding Communities in a Refugee Settlement, a Casebook from Uganda.
Oxfam GB: Oxford.
Reynal-Querol, Marta, and Jose G. Montalvo. 2005. “Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict and
Civil War.” American Economic Review 95(3): 796-816.
Reynal-Querol, Marta. 2002. “Ethnicity, Political Systems and Civil Wars.” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1): 29-54.
Saad, Hwaida. 2014. “Fighters from Syria Kill 10 Lebanese Soldiers in Battle Over
Border Town.” The New York Times, August.
Salehyan, Idean, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2006. “Refugees and The Spread of Civil War.”
International Organization 60(2): 335-366.
Salehyan, Idean. “Transnational Rebels: Neighboring States as Sanctuary for Rebel Groups.”
World Politics 59(2): 217-242.
Sesay, Fatmata Lovetta. 2004. “Conflict in Neighbouring (Developing) Countries: Direct and
Indirect Effects On Economic Growth.” Ph.D. dissertation Ludwig Maximilian
University.
Shacknove, Andrew E. 1985. “Who Is a Refugee?” Ethics 95(2): 274-284.
Standing, Guy. 2011. The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Stewart, Julie. 2011. “Agency and Empowerment under Unlikely Conditions: Exploring How
Wartime Displacement Can Promote Community Development.” Humanity & Society
35(3): 233-260.
The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2016). “Total Unemployment.”
Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Turner, Simon. 2004. “New Opportunities: Angry Young Men in a Tanzanian Refugee Camp.”
In Refugees and the Transformation of Societies: Agency, policies, ethics and politics, ed.
Philomena Essed, Georg Frerks, and Joke Schrijvers, 94-105. New York: Berghahan
Books.
UNHCR. 1951. “The Refugee Convention 1951.” http://www.unhcr.org/4ca34be29.html
(accessed 11/15/2014).
UNHCR. 1967. “Convention and Protocol Relating to The Status of Refugees.” Resolution 2198
(XXI).
UNHCR. 1999. Handbook for Emergencies. Geneva: UNHCR.
UNHCR. 2013. “UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database: Sources, Methods and Data
Considerations” www.unhcr.org/45c06c662.html#refugees (accessed 12/12/2015).

54
UNHCR. 2015. “Syria Regional Refugee Response.” October 10.
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/settlement.php?id=176&region=77&country=107
(accessed 10/22/2015).
United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. 2005. “World Refugee Survey.”
http://www.refworld.org/publisher/USCRI.html (accessed 1/22/2016).
United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. 2006. “World Refugee Survey.”
http://www.refworld.org/publisher/USCRI.html (accessed 1/22/2016).
United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. 2007. “World Refugee Survey.”
http://www.refworld.org/publisher/USCRI.html (accessed 1/22/2016).
United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. 2008. “World Refugee Survey.”
http://www.refworld.org/publisher/USCRI.html (accessed 1/22/2016).
United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. 2009. “World Refugee Survey.”
http://www.refworld.org/publisher/USCRI.html (accessed 1/22/2016).
Waters, Tony. 1996. “Emergency Assistance and Development, or what has a Cash Bath done
for Western Tanzania’s Wahangaza.” Unpublished paper.
https://www.academia.edu/8156157/Emergency_Assistance_and_Development_What_ha
s_a_Cash_Bath_done_for_Western_Tanzanias_Wahangaza (accessed 10/19/2015).
Weiner, Myron. 1978. Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press.
Whitaker, Beth Elise. 1999. “Changing Opportunities: Refugees and Host Communities in
Western Tanzania.” Centre for Documentation and Research, United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees. http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6a0c70.html (accessed
11/10/2015).
Whitaker, Beth Elise. 2002. “Refugees in Western Tanzania: The Distribution of Burdens and
Benefits Among Local Hosts.” Journal of Refugee Studies 15(4): 339-358.
World Bank. (2003). “Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy.” Policy
research Report, World Bank Group.
Zolberg, Aristide R., Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo. 1992. Escape from Violence: Conflict
and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World. Oxford: Oxford University Press on
Demand.

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

